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In 1996 Austria introduced a tax for the layo of older workers, which
was tightened in 2000. The regulation requires employers to pay a tax
of up to 170 percent of the gross monthly income when they give notice
to employees aged 50 or more. We use data from Austrian social security
records to investigate if such layo taxes lead to less ring of older workers.
We compare a control group of workers aged nearly 50 with the treatment
group above 50. We apply a dierence-in-dierence approach to analyze
the dierence in the displacement probability of all prime aged workers.
Results show substantial reductions in layo behavior for workers aged 50
and above after the tightening of the tax.
Keywords: Layo tax, labor demand, employment, elderly workers.
JEL classication: J14, J45, J631 Introduction
Population forecasts predict that in many Western European countries the young
population will shrink relatively to the population above the age of 50. This may
pose serious problems to the current social security system in the next decades.
\If there is no change in work and retirement patterns, the ratio of older inactive
persons per worker will almost double from around 38% in the OECD area in
2000 to just over 70% in 2050. In Europe, this ratio could rise to almost one
older inactive person for every worker over the same period." (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (2006) p. 9)
An aging workforce in general combines in Austria with very low labor force
participation rates of workers above 50. Moreover, also unemployment rates for
this age group increased signicantly in the early 1990s: the unemployment rate
for persons above age 50 was some 40% higher as compared to prime-age workers.
It seems that employers often used the unemployment insurance system as an easy
way of getting rid of aging workers with higher wage demands.1 In many cases
prolonged unemployment led to early retirement in one form or the other. In
order to force the rms to internalize these neglected costs to the social insurance
administration, Austria reacted with a reform in employment protection for the
elderly: starting in 1996, a layo tax was introduced to encourage the ongoing
employment of people aged 50 and above.2
We will study the immediate impact of this layo tax on the termination of
employment contracts for elderly workers. Economic theory would suggest im-
1 Ichino et al. (2006) extensively study re-employment problems of elderly workers after job
displacement. They nd that elderly workers above 50 face signicantly higher non-employment
rates even ve years after displacement - compared to younger cohorts.
2Additionally, employers got a bonus in the form of reduced social security contributions if
they hired older workers.
1portant ramications of this law: due to increased job protection, hiring behavior
of rms with respect to highly-protected elderly workers might be aected as well.
In addition, due to the partial character of the employment protection, substitu-
tion processes might occur: If ring of elderly workers gets punished by a layo
tax, why not lay o somebody else? Due to the construction of the Austrian
law - workers subject to the layo tax have to be employed in the rm for at
least ten years - detrimental impacts on hiring behaviour are highly unlikely. As
the typical retirement age of Austrian workers is well below age 60, this tenure
condition will not bite for hires above age 50.
Several authors have looked at the impact of partial employment protection on
changes in the employment structure (Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Kugler and
Pica (2005), Hernanz et al. (2002)). Behaghel et al. (2008) analyzes a similar
regulation for France: the\Delalande tax". As the French law has not very strict
tenure restrictions on the applicability of the layo tax, Behaghel et al. (2008)
are principally interested in detrimental side eects of this malus legislation: the
reduced hiring of elderly workers. Boockmann et al. (2007) look at a similar leg-
islation in Germany, where hiring subsidies for the employment of elderly workers
were given.
The introduction of this Austrian regulation in 1996 and a change in 2000 form
two quasi-experimental situations. As we are able to observe the universe of
Austrian workers we can use a dierence-in-dierence framework using cohorts
relatively close to the 50 year threshold. Dierent details of the legislation in
terms of tenure requirements and the amount of the tax allow some additional
approaches to identify the eect of this legislation on layo behavior of rms. We
use information on the complete workforce of the rms to investigate potential
substitution eects of the legislation.
22 Austrian Pension System and Layo Tax
2.1 The Pension System
Austria has a very generous but also expensive pension system. While the regular
retirement age (65 years for men and 60 years for women) is similar to other
countries, the average actual retirement age of workers decreased from 61.9 in
1970 to 58.4 in 1999 for men and from 60.4 to 56.7 for women (Hauptverband der
 osterr. Sozialversicherungstr ager (2000), ch. 3, p. 7). Workers could choose to
go for early retirement 5 years before the regular retirement age (i.e. 55 years for
women and 60 years for men) when they have contributed to the public pension
insurance for a long time (`early retirement due to long term on an insurance').
In addition to this, disability pensions are another form of early retirement, which
accounts for 13 percent of the awarded pensions and 19.5 percent of all retirees
in 1999 (Hauptverband der  osterr. Sozialversicherungstr ager (2000), ch. 3, p. 3).
After a change in the government in the year 2000, the new government decided
to reform the pension system. As a part of that reform the layo tax of 1999 was
increased sharply. The minimum retirement age was increased by 18 months for
men and for women. In addition to this, the reform introduced restrictions for
claiming disability pensions, where it was ruled out to claim disability pension
due to reduced working ability below the age of 57.
Private or employer-provided occupational pensions basically do not exist in Aus-
tria (Brunner et al. (2005)). Workers leaving a rm were entitled to severance
payment by the employer. This severance payment has to be paid only if the
worker did not quit voluntarily or leaves into retirement. It increases from two
monthly salaries after three years of tenure stepwise up to a yearly salary after 25
3years of tenure. This forms a strong incentive for high tenured (elderly) workers
not to quit voluntary.
2.2 The Layo Tax
The layo tax became eective in April 1996. If an employee is older than 50 years
and has been continuously employed for more than 10 years by one employer, a
period which may include breaks less than a year, the employer has to pay a tax
when he gives notice. There is no tax in case of a voluntary quit initiated by the
worker, if the contract was suspended in mutual agreement with the employee or
a dismissal was based on serious misconduct by the employee. In October 2000,
this layo tax was sharply increased by a new social security law reform.
As the tax is designed to internalize the costs to the social security administration
in case of a layo, it depends on the age of the worker, the number of months until
the earliest possible retirement and the monthly gross income of the dismissed
employee.
tax(age) = (retirement age   age)  baserate(age)  monthly income
Figures 1 and 2 display the layo tax for male and female employees as a per-
centage of monthly income. Both the original tax of 1996 and the reform of 2000
are shown. Due to the intention of the law we see an inverse U-shape of the tax,
which is the result of a phasing in of the tax together with an alleviating eect
due to the approaching of the early retirement age: the closer a dismissed per-
son is to regular retirement age, the lower will be the cost to the unemployment
benet system and the lower the corresponding tax. For all age groups the tax
4is lower for women as compared to men; both in the rst regime as well as in the
reform regime.3 The increase due to the reform is relatively sharper, though: the
maximum tax rate has been increased by approximately one third (37 percent)
for men while it was nearly doubled for women (78 percent).
As the size of the tax varies heavily with the age of the worker, we will take up
this issue in the evaluation.
3 Data
The Austrian social security database (ASSD, Zweim uller et al. (2008)) consists
of matched administrative records. It contains detailed information about em-
ployment, unemployment, long term sickness, etc. at the individual level; the
data are matched from Social Security records and records from the Employment
Oce. The data set covers all information for the years 1972 to 2001 for all
workers in Austria excluding public servants.
For the empirical analysis we concentrate on quarterly layo rates. For each
reference date in a quarter (February 10, May 10,...) we collect a sample of
employed persons fullling the following conditions: tenure with the rm longer
than 10 years, age at the reference date between 45 and 60 for men and between
45 and 55 for women.4
For these workers we construct layo rates for a period of three months after the
reference date. As many workers are not laid o, but quit their job voluntar-
3This is due to dierent early retirement ages (men 60 years in 1996 and 61.5 years in 2000;
women 55 years in 1996 and 56.5 years in 2000).
4We exclude workers employed in construction and tourism due to a very high temporary
layo phenomenon as well as all non-civil servant employees in the public sector as well as
in the transport sector (public railway system) because these workers enjoy unusually high
employment protection.
5ily, we also construct a probability that the worker quits for other reasons. As
usual in administrative data sets, the reason why a worker left his or her rm is
not coded. Involuntary dismissals can be identied due to unemployment ben-
et regulations: workers who quit voluntarily or with mutual agreement do not
have any benet claims in the rst 4 weeks after leaving the rm, whereas those
involuntary dismissed can start their claims on the rst day.
3.1 Descriptives
Table 1 shows simple descriptive statistics of the overall population of workers
in Austria. Overall about 175,000 male workers were employed (longer than 5
years) during both periods.
Only employees with a tenure of more than 10 years are protected by the law.
Amongst them, a male worker is employed on average 6.26 (6.00) periods over all
8 observed periods (4 quarters before and after the policy change) in 1996 (2000).
Female employees remain on average 5.71 (5.67) periods in the sample in 1996
(2000).
Age specic displacement rates are rising with age both for men and women. The
share of workers who leave the rm for other reasons - mainly voluntary quits
is in general somewhat higher than the share of displaced workers, but has no
relation to age. The share of retiring workers is comparably small, but increases
with age.
64 Evaluation
As the eects of the layo tax on hiring can be ruled out due to the tenure rule,
we concentrate on the displacement of workers. Using the universe of Austrian
workers, we look at a period of four quarters before and four quarters after the
introduction or the change of the layo tax and use quarterly layo rates. If a
registered worker changes to a recipient of unemployment benets within four
weeks after leaving paid employment, we consider him or her as being laid o in
the sense of the regulation.
If it could be assumed that one can precisely estimate the eect in an arbitrarily
small neighborhood of the threshold - around age 50 of the workers - than a
regression discontinuity approach would be the method of choice. In our case
layo probabilities will diverge on both sides of the threshold because of the
possibility of substituting potential layo victims with workers with dierent but
similar characteristics.
For these reasons, we use a dierence in dierence (DD) approach to study
changes in the layo probabilities of workers farther away from the threshold.
The policy evaluation relies on variation between the birth cohorts over time,
because the layo taxes dier in various ways according to age.5
Figures 3 and 4 show layo probabilities for women and men according to age
for the years before and after the introduction and change of the law. The peak
5Taking into account that rms only have to pay the layo tax for workers who were employed
for more than 10 years, tenure could have been added as another threshold to the analysis. Due
to data problems, job tenure in a rm can only be bounded from below: if the worker stays in
the same rm, tenure can unambiguously be calculated, if the worker switched to another job
within a corporation, actual tenure - which is relevant for the application of the law - might be
higher.
7in layo probability for higher age groups is persistent, it shifts a bit to the right
over the years, though.
First, the age dimension of the data can be separated in two groups. The cohorts
aged between 45 and 49 years and 9 months (49.75 years from now on) are the
control group. Using workers aged between 49.75{50 years would be inappropriate
because they would change to treatment status during the observation period of
a quarter.
Apart from comparing all workers aged 50 and above with the control group
aged between 45 and 49.75 we can also study separate eects for dierent age
groups. Figures 5 and 6 show the time pattern of displacement probabilities more
clearly. The introduction of the regulation in 1996 as well as the change in 2000
are indicated by vertical lines. We see a strong seasonal pattern of layo rates.
While the introduction of the law in 1996 does not seem to have in
uenced layo
patterns both for women and men, the change of the law in 2000 led to a markable
reduction in layos.
4.1 Empirical Results
At rst we use a simple dierence-in-dierence probit model to compare the
displacement probability of our treatment group aged 50 and above with the
control group below the threshold. To calculate marginal eects we use the
method proposed in Ai and Norton (2003) for dierence-in-dierence estimates
in a nonlinear case. In a rst DD model we include only seasonal dummies and
the variables to estimate the DD eect:
P(D) = (X + 1I(after) + 2I(age > 50) + 3I(after)I(age > 50)): (1)
8In a second DD model we include covariates to describe the characteristics of
the employee, the employment spell and the rm. We include age, citizenship
and tenure dummies as characteristics of the employee, rm size and a dummies
for the type of economic activity (10 groups) as characteristics of the rm. Fi-
nally, we take work experience, a dummy indicating blue collar work and the log
wage rate as characteristics of the employment spell. The third model uses all
these covariates and additionally allows for age specic treatment eects of the
regulation.
The simple DD model in Table 2 reproduces the visual results of the Figures 6
and 5 as discussed above. The introduction of the tax in 1996 seems to have an
perverse eect of increasing displacement in the treatment group. After including
covariates this eect vanishes and only the negative eects of the increase of the
layo tax in 2000 remain signicant.
The estimated eects are both economically and statistically signicant. The
reduction of 0.28 percentage points of the displacement rate of male workers
amounts to more than 25 percent of the real displacement rate of 1.1 % of this
group. The displacement rate of the elderly female workers (1.41 %) was reduced
by a third or 0.47 percentage points. It seems that the amount of the the tax at
the introductory stage was too small to induce any signicant changes in behavior.
Using the age specic treatment model, we see that the major eect is driven by
the reduction in displacement for the oldest group of workers. 6 In 1996 with the
introduction of the tax, we see reductions in the layo rates for the lowest age
groups but signicant increases for the oldest men (57.5-) and the oldest women
(52-5-) in our sample. As the amount of the tax was rather small - 20-40% of one
6Note that we restrict our samples to workers below age 60 for men and below age 55 for
women to be able to distinguish our eects from the eects of retirement age increases in 2000,
which aected only workers above that age.
9monthly income - unexpected behavioral responses by rms could be responsible.
If there is a social norm not to re elderly workers due to fairness concerns or
implicit contracts, (too) small monetary incentives could backre: a layo tax
could make the social norm obsolete because the ring tax has been paid anyway
(Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)).7
After the tax was increased in 2000, we nd generally more negative eects and
the strongest reductions in layo rates for the oldest workers in our sample. One
way to interpret our results would be to compare the situation of the higher layo
tax - as of the year 2000 - with a situation without a tax. Due to the longer time
span of the introduction and raising of the tax over four and a half year a direct
estimation strategy is not possible. A rough summarizing of the two eects in 2
we see that we can rule out behavioral eects due to social norms: comparing the
situation without a tax with the situation with the highest tax in the year 2000,
layo rates in almost all age groups got reduced.
5 Does Substitution Matter?
While the introduction and in particular the increase of the layo tax up to two
monthly wages directly reduced layo rates of the rms, other eects of this
legislation on layo behavior of rms are possible as well. The introduction of
such a ring tax will leave rms with a suboptimal number and structure of their
workforce. Firms might therefore react to these constraints by some sort of of
substitution. First, as the tax is payable only if the worker is laid o but not in
the case of a quit initiated by the worker, the rm could use dierent means to
7See also Winter-Ebmer (2003) for an implicit contracts explanation of ring behavior among
Austrian rms.
10mob or bribe the worker to leave the rm "voluntarily". Second, the rm can try
to substitute away from the type of worker which would be taxed to a very similar
type of worker not subject to the tax, i.e. younger or less tenured workers. While
the rst coping strategy requires the study of all exit routes by workers leaving
the rm, substituting away from "taxable" workers can be studied by looking at
turnover rates of whole rms.
5.1 Using Other Exit Routes
We use multinomial logit models to analyse the rst type of substitution which
happens at the individual level: if an older worker whose layo is taxable is to be
made redundant, several forms of exits are possible: a taxable layo, an induced
"voluntary quit"and an induced early retirement by means of invalidity pension,
etc. If taxable layos are substituted by non-taxable ones, we should see an
increase in the exit rates for pensions and voluntary quits due to the layo tax.
In table 3 we use a multinomial logit model to take three exits routes into account:
(early) retirement, layo and other (mainly voluntary) quits. The base category
of all these models is still working for the rm. We see that the large negative
impact of the layo tax in the year 2000 for both women and men is consistent
with the previous results. We see some evidence of an increase in voluntary
quits in the year 1996, both for men and women which could be explained by a
substitution phenomenon.
5.2 Dismissing Other Workers?
If the layo tax makes layos of the specially protected group of workers more
expensive, the employer could decide instead to lay o similar personnel. The
11rm could easily choose someone with less tenure or a worker whose age is slightly
below the threshold. One way to test for this phenomenon is to use the complete
ring behavior of rms. Under regular circumstances it cannot be tested if the
layo tax reduced ring of "taxable"persons and at the same time increased ring
behavior of some other group because there is no control group anymore. As we
can observe the full layo patterns of all Austrian rms we can come up with a
novel idea of a control group: Firing behavior of rms having no workers who are
eligible for the ring tax among their personnel should not be in
uenced by the
introduction of the tax.
In the following we look at quarterly dismissal rates of rms. We can look at
two dierent outcomes: rst, the total number of layos of older workers (aged
45+), and, second, the number of layos of all types of non-tax eligible workers,
i.e. below age 50 or less tenured workers. As whole rms' behavior in terms of
workforce composition can be observed we can estimate models at the rm level.
A dierence-in-dierence framework in this respect will show the dierential layo
behavior of rms who should be aected by the tax relative to rms who - due to
their workforce composition - could not possibly be aected by the layo tax. The
identifying assumption here is that the development of layo rates of treated and
control rms is the same over time. Substitution eects - i.e. increased layo of
other workers - can be identied by a positive coecient for non-eligible workers.
The dierence-in-dierence eect for all workers can - in turn - be interpreted as
the overall eect of the law.
Due to the count data aspect of the number of layos in a particular rm and
quarter we use a negative binomial regression model.8 In Table 4 we can see that
8If we would neglect the dierences in rm size our regression estimates would be biased,
since a negative binomial model assumes all rms to have the same number of employees. We
12rms employing eligible workers show, consistently with the previous results,
no signicant reaction to the regulation in 1996. There is also no sign of a
substitution on non-eligible workers. In contrast to this, for the increase of the
tax in 2000 we see a decrease in the total number of layos by 0.0013 per rm and
quarter. Likewise, we nd an increase in layos for non-eligible workers by the
same amount. We can interpret these ndings as follows: the layo tax seems to
reduce the layo of eligible workers, but about one half of this eect is substituted
with an increase of non-taxable dismissals.
6 Conclusions
In 1996 Austria introduced a layo tax which was meant to reduce the ring of
elderly workers. As the initial amount of the tax was rather low, no eects on
layo rates could be observed - which might be due to a crowding out of social
norms by too small nancial incentives. After increasing the tax, layo rates - in
particular for the group of the oldest workers - decreased signicantly.
Selective employment protection measures can often lead to perverse eects when
rms try to avoid the tax by reduced hiring or substitution processes. We use two
strategies to check if rms use such substitution strategies. Mobbing or bribing
could be two strategies to get rid of workers without formally laying them o -
by inducing them to quit voluntarily. In the data we do not nd evidence for
such strategies. While we see some evidence that rms do change their ring
behavior by increasing the ring of non-taxable workers - i.e younger or non-
tenured workers; the general pattern of the tax remains still valid.
account for these dierences by adding the log of rm size as a measure of exposure with its
coecient constrained to one.
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18Table 1: Descriptive Statistics About Job Status (By Age Categories)
Overall 45{47.5 47.5{50
a 50{52.5 52.5{55 55{57.5 57.5{
1996
Men
Individuals 128,924 37,639 18,532 23,681 24,201 17,560 7,311
Quarters (avg) 6.26 5.82 6.32 6.98 6.83 6.40 3.85
Displaced 1.10 % 0.85 % 0.85 % 0.87 % 1.03 % 1.34 % 2.51 %
Retired 0.65 % 0.05 % 0.09 % 0.15 % 0.39 % 1.52 % 3.50 %
Other Quits 2.70 % 2.50 % 2.69 % 2.66 % 2.94 % 2.80 % 2.50 %
Women
Individuals 66,349 37,755 19,218 24,006 19,693
Quarters (avg) 5.71 5.78 6.14 6.72 3.84
Displaced 1.66 % 1.19 % 1.27 % 1.59 % 2.70 %
Retired 0.40 % 0.05 % 0.09 % 0.16 % 1.38 %
Other Quits 2.34 % 2.24 % 2.27 % 2.44 % 2.44 %
2000
Men
Individuals 131,020 51,680 25,641 32,587 23,173 22,492 19,390
Quarters (avg) 6.00 5.58 6.25 6.85 6.70 6.35 3.80
Displaced 1.01 % 0.72 % 0.76 % 0.83 % 0.90 % 1.19 % 2.13 %
Retired 2.71 % 0.04 % 0.07 % 0.13 % 0.30 % 1.33 % 2.31 %
Other Quits 0.56 % 2.41 % 2.56 % 2.73 % 2.97 % 3.16 % 2.39 %
Women
Individuals 64,001 37,694 19,274 24,243 21,240
Quarters (avg) 5.67 5.55 6.04 6.59 4.05
Displaced 1.41 % 1.00 % 1.14 % 1.34 % 2.24 %
Retired 0.14 % 0.04 % 0.07 % 0.14 % 0.33 %
Other Quits 2.60 % 2.34 % 2.45 % 2.76 % 2.88 %
a This category does not include 49.75{50 years old workers (see later)
The relative displacement probabilities are calculated for all eight quarters together.
(i.e. 4 quarters before and 4 quarters after the introduction / change of the layo tax)
19Table 2: DD Estimates on the Eect of Layo Taxes on the Probability of Layo
Men Women
Year 1996 2000 1996 2000
Displacement










(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)




(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10)
52.5 { 55.0 -0.08 0.00 0.19
* -0.83
***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
55.0 { 57.5 0.09 -0.27
***
(0.06) (0.07)




Obs [806,955] [785,535] [378,552] [362,702]
Workers 128,881 130,883 66,319 63,900
a Mean Displacement probabilities in treatment cohort.
b Simple DD is calculated including only seasonal dummies.
All DD estimates are marginal eects of a clustered probit regression, printed in
percentage points. Other variables are: age, citizenship, yearly tenure dummies,
rm size and dummies for the type of economic activity (10 groups), work experi-




signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
20Table 3: DD Estimates of Dierent Exit Categories: Multinomial Logit Model
Simple DD DD
a







(0.039) (0.101) (0.082) (0.049) (0.072) (0.058)
[378,744] 66,349 workers [378,552] 66,319 workers
2000 -0.024 -0.081 -0.448
*** -0.018 -0.107 -0.408
***
(0.024) (0.096) (0.061) (0.016) (0.080) (0.060)








(0.030) (0.078) (0.039) (0.019) (0.060) (0.034)






(0.024) (0.077) (0.040) (0.019) (0.063) (0.026)
[786,240] 131,020 workers [785,535] 130,883 workers
a DD with covariates (seasonal dummies(3), blue collar worker dummy, rmsize,
sector dummies(7), tenure dummies(15+), wage, experience, age dummies(8+),
austrian citizenship dummy).
All DD estimates are marginal eects of the interaction term in a multinomial
logit regression presented in percentage points. Other variables are: age, citi-
zenship, yearly tenure dummies, rm size and dummies for the type of economic
activity (10 groups), work experience, a dummy indicating blue collar work and
the log wage rate. Signicance levels and standard errors (in parenthesis) calcu-
lated using bootstrapping methods. No of observations in brackets.
21Table 4: DD Estimates at the Firm Level
1996 2000
Types of workers Non-Eligible All Non-Eligible All
Layos
a 0.0385 0.0703 0.0347 0.0634
DD
b -0.0011 0.0007 0.0013
* -0.0013
**
(0.00068) (0.00062) (0.00067) (0.00063)
Obs [238,150] [312,098] [233,110] [302,720]
Firms 40,833 49,407 41,106 49,252
2 3207.60 4151.46 3104.73 4340.88
a Mean number of laid o workers in a rm per quarter.
b Marginal eect of layo tax on rm-specic layo rates. Control group
are rms without workers eligible for the tax.
Negative binomial regression of quarterly rm-specic layos. Control
variables include: relative share of blue collar workers, relative share of
female workers, median wage, regional dummies(8), seasonal dummies




signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
22